root@rumais:~# inspect agentsudo
Agent Sudo
Linux room covering service enumeration, initial access, and privilege escalation. This page combines the local notes, supporting artifacts, and a cleaned-up summary of the room path.
Room Details
Built from supporting notes and artifacts. This room is grouped under Linux and PrivEsc.
Summary
Typical public walkthrough flow for this room is: enumerate HTTP/FTP/SSH, manipulate the User-Agent header to reveal the hidden clue, brute-force or recover FTP access for Chris, extract hidden material from the image files with binwalk and steghide, recover James's SSH access, then abuse sudo misconfiguration tied to CVE-2019-14287 for privilege escalation.
Notes
Recon
- Initial enumeration exposes three primary services:
ftp,ssh, andhttp. - The web layer contains the first pivot. Changing the
User-Agentvalue reveals the hidden clue path and points toward the next user context.
Initial Access
- After identifying the hidden hint on the web service, the workflow moves to FTP access recovery.
- Image artifacts in the FTP-accessible material contain the next secrets. The intended path uses
binwalkandsteghide-style extraction to recover embedded data. - Those recovered secrets provide the bridge to the SSH foothold.
Privilege Escalation
- Once the Linux user shell is established, local enumeration shows a permissive
sudoconfiguration. - The escalation path maps to
CVE-2019-14287, where a sudo rule can be abused to execute commands as root despite an apparent restriction.
Security Notes
- Treat client-controlled headers as untrusted, but remember they can still expose workflow clues or logic differences during testing.
- Hidden data in images and archives is a common challenge pattern and a good reminder to inspect artifacts, not just obvious files.
- Sudo policy edge cases remain high-value privilege-escalation findings on Linux systems.
Supporting Files
To Agentj
Dear agent J, All these alien like photos are fake! Agent R stored the real picture inside your directory. Your login password is somehow stored in the fake picture. It shouldn’t be a problem for you. From, Agent C
Message
Hi james, Glad you find this message. Your login password is hackerrules! Don’t ask me why the password look cheesy, ask agent R who set this password for you. Your buddy, chris
Collected Output
nmap-initial
# Nmap 7.91 scan initiated Wed Jun 23 22:58:18 2021 as: nmap -sV -sC -A -oN nmap-initial 10.10.39.230
Nmap scan report for 10.10.39.230
Host is up (0.50s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp vsftpd 3.0.3
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 ef:1f:5d:04:d4:77:95:06:60:72:ec:f0:58:f2:cc:07 (RSA)
| 256 5e:02:d1:9a:c4:e7:43:06:62:c1:9e:25:84:8a:e7:ea (ECDSA)
|_ 256 2d:00:5c:b9:fd:a8:c8:d8:80:e3:92:4f:8b:4f:18:e2 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Announcement
Aggressive OS guesses: ASUS RT-N56U WAP (Linux 3.4) (95%), Linux 3.16 (95%), Linux 3.1 (93%), Linux 3.2 (93%), Linux 3.10 - 3.13 (93%), AXIS 210A or 211 Network Camera (Linux 2.6.17) (92%), Synology DiskStation Manager 5.2-5644 (92%), Linux 3.8 (91%), QNAP QTS 4.0 - 4.2 (91%), Linux 2.6.32 - 3.10 (90%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 4 hops
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE (using port 554/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 412.32 ms 10.2.0.1
2 ... 3
4 554.03 ms 10.10.39.230
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Wed Jun 23 23:01:36 2021 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 199.28 seconds